Introduction and Motivation
This paper explores the switch from a progressive tax schedule to a Pproportional (flat) tax regime on Jan. 1, 2008 in Bulgaria, and its welfare effects. In contrast to Vasilev (2015) , here the focus falls on the "whitening-out" effect of taxation on the grey economy, and the mechanism at work that is operating though the official-unofficial sector households' labor decision. Using a calibrated micro-founded general-equilibrium model with informal sector a la Conesa et al. (2001) , this study provides a quantitative evaluation of the effect resulting from the introduction of flat income taxation in Bulgaria in 2008. 1 Under proportional taxation system featuring a lower effective income tax rate than the corresponding rate under the progressive regime, a significant reallocation of labor from unregistered activities to the official sector is observed. In addition, since labor and capital are assumed to be complements in the production of registered output, the increase in official employment increases the marginal productivity of capital. In turn, that provides a strong incentive for households to increase capital accumulation, thus enhancing the productive capacity of the economy.
The resulting increase in output then allows for higher consumption possibilities, which directly translate into significant welfare gains. As in Vasilev (2015) , the model in this paper will abstract away from corporate profit and dividend taxation, and will exclusively focus on the effect of personal income taxation on labor and capital cupply decisions. 2
The papers aims to contribute to the debates in the public finance literature as well. After all, direct income taxation makes a significant share of total tax revenue, 3 even for countries that have organized their taxation systems around indirect (consumption-based) taxation. Those countries, Bulgaria being a typical representative, usually lack sufficiently well-qualified tax administration and cannot depend on direct taxation as the major source of revenue for the government. In addition, a progressive income taxation (introduced for equity considerations) makes tax collection even more difficult. The problems of high marginal tax rates 1 Even though a flat corporate tax rate of 10 % (and a 5% divident/capital gains tax) was introduced in 2007, the flat tax rate of 10 % on household's income was introduced in 2008.
2 Still, it is important to have the same tax rate applied to labor and capital income -otherwise small business owners would declare their income to be the one that is levied with the lower tax. 3 In Bulgaria, the share of personal income tax revenue out of total government revenue is approximately 10 %. and progressivity itself were further exacerbated due to the wide-spread tax evasion and non-compliance, and to a certain extend the skilled-worker migration outflows in the early 1990s.
In contrast, the proportional ("flat") taxation is a much simpler tax system, which makes it more transparent, and much easier to administer. More specifically, a reduction in both the average and the effective rate generally has a (partial) "amnesty" effect: tax compliance is expected to improve as the incentive from operating in the unofficial sector is now lower.
Labor services are reallocated to the official sector, and total tax revenue collected would increase as well. In addition, as the size of the grey economy decreases, a lower tax burden, combined with better transparency, would also encourage investment and increase welfare.
Therefore, the Bulgarian personal income tax reform implemented in 2008 could be of significant importance for other transition and developing countries featuring a large unofficial sector, and who might wish to consider the adoption of proportional taxation as a tool to decrease the size of their grey economy. However, as Peichl (2014) notes, despite all the advantages, flat tax implementation "has mostly been restricted to the transition economy countries of Eastern Europe," with the date of adoption and rates documented in Table 1 on the next page. The patten that emerges is that despite the existence of a group with the same tax rate chosen (10 %), there is a significant variety in the levels introduced in the other countries in the region. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the discussion of the Bulgarian case should be taken with a degree of caution. Indeed, one tax rate does not fit all the countries in the sample.
The theoretical setup used in this paper to study the flat tax reform in Bulgaria will build on Conesa et al. (2001) by augmenting it with a sufficiently-detailed government sector to capture the distortionary effect of personal income taxation. The framework in the original paper builds on Hansen (1985) and Rogerson's (1988) work on indivisibilities, where hours worked per person is fixed, and the decision margin is the employment rate. Similarly, in this paper working time in the official sector will be contracted exogenously, and the only decision in the setup will be whether to participate or not in the official sector. That is, labor in indivisible in the official sector, and divisible in the grey economy. More specifically, each Federation of Bosnia 2009 10-15 10 10 10
Source: Peichl (2014) individual will face a two-stage decision: (i) whether or not to work full-time in the official labor market (the "participation margin" in the official sector), and (ii) conditional on not working in the registered economy, whether to work in the grey economy(the "participation margin" in the unofficial sector), and if so, how many hours to supply there (the "intensive margin" in the unofficial sector). The wage in the unofficial sector will be approximated by the minimum wage rate, while the rate in the official sector would correspond to the average wage rate in the economy. 4 Note that in this setup the output from the underground economy would count towards total production. The unofficial sector technology is an alter-4 Given the lack of data on wages in the unofficial sector, it will be assumed that the most workers could earn there is the minimum wage. If that were not the case, those workers would have been better-off working in the official sector.
native (labor-intensive) way to produce goods and services. 5 Thus, the model generates a quantitative estimate of the underground economy relative to the official sector, which can be compared to figures obtained in empirical studies, e.g. Charmes (2000) , OECD (2009), and the European Commission (2012).
Fiscal policies, and in particular personal income taxation policies, are known to affect households' incentives to invest in physical capital, and their decisions to provide labor services to businesses in either the official or the informal sector. The analysis of the effect of tax policies within the framework of exogenous growth models is relatively recent, e.g., King and Rebelo (1990) . More recent treatments on the subject in the context of transition the importance of this unregistered production is that it is non-tradables." 6 The description of the progressive tax system in Bulgaria in this section follows the structure used in Vasilev (2015) .
page for monthly income levels in Bulgarian leva (BGN) in 2007. 7 Furthermore, as seen from Table 3 on the next page, the relative importance of personal income tax revenue has somewhat increased in terms of the share of total tax revenue collected, while the relative share of the revenues from taxed personal income as a share in output has been relatively flat. The absence of any increase in that component is due to the recent financial crisis than unravelled in 2008-09.
Next, we go one step deeper and decompose personal income tax revenue into its major sources. In Table 4 on the next page, the share of labor income from the personal income (2012) tax is the largest (81%) component of personal income tax receipts has increases substantially over this short period: 10.97 percentage points growth in 2008, 8.41 in 2009, 0.30 in 2010, and 4.43 in 2011. 8 Since it is hard to believe that people have suddenly become more laborious, an explanation based on the reallocation of workers from the grey to the official economy seems quite plausible given the data available. 9 Lump-sum tax 2.00% 1.52% 1.02% 0.94% 0.78%
One-off tax 3.65% 4.06% 4.49% 5.02% 5.50%
Source: Petkova (2012) After presenting the public finance figures and their relevance for the effect from the adoption of flat income taxation, the paper will utilize a carefully calibrated general-equilibrium model to match Bulgaria's post-communist behavior will demonstrate that progressive taxation creates a bigger burden by decreasing the return to capital and labor, and thus lowering the incentive to operate in the official sector, and significantly more so than the effective tax rate under flat income taxation. Thus, substantial welfare benefits can be realized when the economy switches from progressive taxation to proportional income taxation with a single 8 The second component, personal income tax revenue from business activities (14%), is decreasing over the period, which reflects the financial crisis, but then rebounds in 2011. 9 An alternative way to confirm the hypothesis that the increase in tax revenue is driven by improvements in tax compliance is to look at the implicit tax rate documented by the European Commission (2012): the rate before the introduction of the flat tax rate was 38.1 % vs. 24.4% for the years after. low rate.
3 Model Setup
Description of the model:
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical agents ("households") distributed uniformly on the [0, 1] interval. Each single-member household in the model economy is infinitely-lived, and there is no population growth. 10 As in Conesa et al. (2001) , each household maximizes the following utility function
where c t is consumption at time t, and l t denotes leisure enjoyed at time t. The parameter β is the discount factor, with 0 < β < 1. The instantaneous utility function U (.) and V (.) are increasing in their arguments and satisfy the Inada conditions. Following Prescott (2002), a logarithmic specification, separable in consumption and leisure, was chosen:
where α > 0 denotes the relative weight attached to the utility of leisure. Next, the household has an endowment of one unit of time in each period t, which is split between work in either the official, or the unofficial ("black market") sector and leisure, l t , so that
where h mt ∈ {0;h} is the indivisible time devoted to working in the official sector in period t,
and h bt ∈ [0, 1] is the (divisible) time spent in the unofficial sector in period t. Also, h bt = 0 whenever h mt =h, hence 0 ≤ h mt + h bt ≤ 1. This assumption guarantees that each worker can only participate in one of the production sectors. The hourly wage rate in the official ("market") and the implicit unofficial ("black market") sectors is denoted by w m t and w b t ,
10 As in Azacis and Gillman (2010) , the model is a closed-economy one, which is a useful simplification.
In a closed economy the return on capital is determined endogenously, and this assumption that cannot be relaxed so easily. However, under the assumption of a closed economy, the welfare gains from the introduction of a flat tax rate might be different from reality, as Bulgaria is a small open economy.
respectively. 11
Following the arguments in Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985) , it can be easily shown that polar cases in which each household either works in the official, or in the unofficial sector, cannot not be equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, it must be the case that a proportion µ t (0 < µ t < 1, ∀t) of the agents in the economy are working in the unofficial sector, while the rest, 1 − µ t , will be supplying labor services in the official sector. Workers in the official sector will receive consumption c mt , while those working in the unofficial sector will consume c bt . Note that µ t can be interpreted also as the probability of being chosen to work in the unofficial sector in period t. This probability is determined endogenously in the model, as workers would seek for the optimal balance between the net return from working across the sectors (at the margin).
In addition to the labor income generated, each household saves by investing i t in physical capital. 12 As an owner of capital, the household receives gross interest income r t k t from renting the capital to the firms; r t is the before-tax return to private capital, and k t denotes physical capital stock in the beginning of period t. Each household's physical capital evolves according to the following law of motion:
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate on capital.
Finally, the households owns all firms in the economy, and receive an equal share of total profit (π t ) in the form of dividends. The households' aggregate budget constraint is
where, as in Guo and Lansing (1998) , tax schedule is represented by the following function:
11 The "wage rate" in the unofficial sector could also be interpreted as the opportunity cost of working in the unofficial sector. 12 For simplicity, we shall assume that in this economy there are no financial assets and the public sector
where τ t denotes the tax rate on total (capital and labor)registered income, i.e, y t = r t k h t + w m t h h mt , and y is the steady-state level of household's income. In addition, 0 < η < 1 and 0 ≤ φ < 1, where φ measures the progressivity of the tax system, and η is the average effective tax rate in steady state. 13 Superscript h is used to distinguish between per household and aggregate allocations.
Next, following Merz (1996) , it will be assumed that households can pool income together and doing so, they will be able to equalize consumption across states, i.e., c mt = c bt = c t .
Then the problem is recast into one of maximizing total expected utility
s.t.
The households acts competitively by taking prices {w m t , w b t , r t } ∞ t=0 , income tax schedule τ t , and chooses allocations {c t , i t , k t , µ t , h bt } ∞ t=0 to maximize Eq.(7) s.t Eqs.
(3)-(6),(8), and initial conditions for physical capital stock {k 0 }.
The optimality conditions from the household's problem, together with the transversality condition (TVC) for physical capital are as follows:
where λ t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the household's budget constraint. The household equates marginal utility from consumption with the marginal cost imposed on its budget.
13 Notice that when φ = 0, τ t = η, i.e., the tax rate is constant ("flat tax"), while φ > 0 produces a tax rate that rises with total income ("progressive tax").
Next, the Euler equation describes the optimal capital accumulation rule, and implicitly characterizes the optimal consumption allocations chosen in any two contiguous periods.
Participation rate is chosen so that at the margin the the net return from working in the official economy is equal to the net cost of doing so, measured in terms of labor income above the salary that would have been obtained in the grey economy. Hours in the grey economy are chosen so that the disutility of an hour work at the margin equals the return to labor in the unofficial sector. The last expression is the TVC, which ensures that the model equilibrium is well-defined by setting the value of the physical capital that remains at the end of the optimization horizon to zero, and thus rules out the possibility for explosive solution paths.
Stand-in Firm: market sector
There is also a representative private firm in the model economy. It produces a homogeneous final product using a production function that requires physical capital k t and labor H m t = (1 − µ t )h. The production function is as follows
where A measures the level of total factor productivity, and 0 < θ < 1 denote the productivity of physical capital and 1 − θ captures the productivity of labor.
The representative firm acts competitively by taking prices {w m t , r t } ∞ t=0 , and chooses k t , H m t , ∀t to maximize firm's static profit:
In equilibrium profit is zero. In addition, efficiency labor and capital receive their marginal products, i.e.
Stand-in Firm: unofficial sector
Each worker in the unofficial sector has access to an individual production function that uses only labor, given by Bh γ t . As in Conesa et al. (2001) , the labor intensive specification for the production process in the unregistered economy seems to be an adequate approximation to reality. Each firm in the unofficial sector will then hire labor h bt in every period to maximize static profit
With free entry, there are zero profits, hence the implicit wage in the unofficial sector equals
Government sector
The government collects tax revenue from registered labor and capital income to finance government expenditure, which are then spent on wasteful government consumption {g c t } ∞ t=0 . The government budget constraint is then
Government takes prices {w m t , r t } ∞ t=0 and allocations {k t , µ t } ∞ t=0 as given. The income tax schedule {τ t } ∞ t=0 will be vary with income, while government consumption {g c t } ∞ t=0 will be residually determined: it will adjust to ensure the government budget constraint is balanced in every time period.
Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
Given the initial conditions for the state variable k 0 , a Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
t=0 such that (i) expected utility is maximized; (ii) the stand-in firm in the unofficial sector maximizes profit every period; (iii) wage rate in the unofficial sector is such that profits in the grey economy are zero every period; (iv) government budget is balanced in each time period; (iv) all markets clear.
Data and model calibration
The model is calibrated to Bulgarian data at quarterly frequency. The period under investigation is 1993-2012 where 1993-2007 is the period when taxation was progressive, and starting from 2008 a flat income tax rate of 10 % for both labor and capital income was introduced. The chapter follows a standard approach in the quantitative macroeconomics literature. Both the data set and steady-state DCE relationships of the models will be used to set the parameter values, in order to replicate relevant long-run moments of the Bulgarian economy for the progressive taxation regime period.
Quarterly data on the output, household consumption, private fixed investment shares in output, employment rate, the average wage rate, and the minimum wage rate was obtained from the National Statistical Institute (NSI). Following Ganev (2005) , capital income share is set to its average value θ = 0.429, and the labor income share is 1 − θ = 0.561. Following Conesa et al. (2001) , parameter γ of the grey economy production function is chosen under the assumption that the labor intensity of the production function in the unofficial sector in Bulgaria is the same as in the the production function used in the official sector,i.e., γ = 0.571. Next, using Ganev's (2005) estimate that the annual depreciation rate on physical capital is 5 %, in our quarterly model that corresponds to δ = 0.0125. Ganev's (2005) annual estimates of the average capital stock to output over the 1992-2007 are then converted to quarterly ones, thus obtaining that K/Y = 13.964. This gives us sufficient information to calibrate the discount factor from the steady-state Euler equation:
The relative weight on leisure in the household's utility function, parameter α, will be set to match the steady-state participation rate in the registered sector in Bulgaria over the period 1 − µ = 0.467 (NSI). 14 Also, given the lack of data on average number of hours worked for Bulgaria, we assume a typical household will work on averageh = 1/3 in the official sector, which is consistent with the estimates in Ghez and Becker (1975) of the fraction of time spent working.
14 The low participation rate is consistent with the experience of Soviet and post-Soviet Baltic states, as documented in Smith (2011) .
In order to calibrate the scale parameter of the production function used in the grey economy, B, we also follow Conesa et al. (2001) . Technology in the underground sector is assumed to be such that workers working full time in the grey economy would earn the minimum wage, as those are mainly workers with no qualification; the implicit assumption is that underground activities do not require any skills. Thus B will be set to match the ratio between the (average) market wage and the minimum wage (for total hours 1/3 worked in the unregistered sector 
Given that the level of total factor productivity can be normalized to unity, A = 1, as this parameter has only a level effect in the model, it turns out the grey economy is approximately 9 percentage points less productive than the official sector, which is an adequate approximation.
Next, we can use the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours in the unofficial sector (evaluated ath), we can express α as
In order to solve for that parameter, we need to substitute consumption out from the feasibility condition 16
Hence
15 In this way we can solve for the steady-state recursively, instead of solving for all variables jointly.
Another advantage is that we can obtain the big ratios directly. 16 For computational simplicity, steady-state output has been normalized to unity.
Following Conesa et al (2007) , we compute the average effective tax rate η = 0.14 for the progressive tax, and η = 0.11 for the flat tax. 17 Next, the (gross) degree of progressivity, 1 + φ, was computed as the ratio of the marginal to the average tax rate. Due to data limitation on the distribution of income levels, we will make the conservative assumption that the lower bound φ = 0.43 is a reasonable value for the progressivity parameter. 18 Table   5 below summarizes the values of all model parameters, and the next section provides the computed values of the model variables in the steady-state. More specifically, the average effective tax rate is approximated by the average amount of tax actually paid, divided by total income. Since the model is an infinitely-lived agents one, and the level of social contributions has not changed substantially, (except for the 3 percentage points cut in social security contributions in the last quarter of 2007, which was quickly reversed shortly after) the model will abstract away from those "taxes". 18 For the three tax brackets, φ = 0.43, 0.57, 0.70, respectively. Robustness checks are performed in later sections of the paper to evaluate how welfare effect of the tax reform depends on the degree of progressivity of the previous regime.
Steady-State
Once model parameters were obtained, the steady-state ratios for the model calibrated to
Bulgarian data were obtained. The results are reported in Table 6 below. As seen from the tabulated values, the model captures relatively well both the consumptionand investment ratio. In addition, the parsimonious model does a relatively good job at matching the after tax net return to capital, which is given byr = 1 − (1 + φ)τ r − δ.
Lastly, government consumption-to-output ratio is also quite well-captured: since r t k t + w m t (1 − µ t )h = y t , it follows from the balanced government budget constraint that g c /y = τ .
Next, the share of the grey economy predicted by our simple model is very close to the estimate by Nenovsky and Hristov (2000) , who compute that share to be 0.268 using mone- of the shadow economy to be 34.5 % of GDP in 2005, three years before the introduction of proportional taxation of personal income in Bulgaria (and down to 31.9 % two years after the adoption of the flat tax regime).
Since no time series for the share of workers employment in the unofficial sector exist, Charmes's (2000) estimate for the transition economies, µ = 0.217, was adopted in this paper. This is also very close to the lower bound of the estimated range by the European
Commission (2012) Note that with the particular calibration, the average effective tax rate and the degree of progressivity of the tax system do not affect the participation rate, as those parameters were taken as given in the model. In addition, the calibration of the model was done under the assumption that all workers in the grey economy dedicateh of their time in the unofficial sector. This will all be relaxed in the welfare analysis in the next section. In particular, keeping discount factor and depreciation rate constant, a lower effective tax rate and no progressivity will raise the after-tax real interest rate. In turn, that would increase capital stock, and lower the employment rate in the unofficial sector, relocate that labor toward the official sector, and ultimately increase consumption.
Welfare Analysis
We will now consider the hypothetical (counterfactual) scenario in which Bulgaria starts in 2008 but did not adopt flat income tax rate. To this thought experiment, we will contrast the observed scenario with flat income taxation since 2008. This would allow to evaluate the asymptotic (steady-state to steady-state) effect of the difference in taxation, holding model parameters unchanged. 20 Note that the participation rate in the grey economy, µ, will vary as we change the tax regime. 20 This long-term approach was preferred in order to abstract away from the effect of the financial crisis.
After all, the tax reform in Bulgaria was introduced in the same year the financial crisis unravelled, so computation of the transition path was ruled out.
After the adoption of proportional taxation, there are two effects: first, we have a decrease in the effective tax burden, and second, all tax progressivity disappears. Both effects lead to the reallocation of hours to the official sector, thus lowering the share of people employed in the grey economy. Informal employment, as well a the size of the grey sector relative to the registered output shrinks by more than half. More specifically, the decrease in the grey economy share is approximately 60 percent. This amount of shrinkage, however, is supposed to happen over the long-term. Still, studies by the European Commission (2012) document a fall in the share of the grey economy from 34.5 percent of GDP in 2005 to 31.9 percent of GDP in 2012, which can be used at least in part as an evidence of the efficiency of the flat tax reform in reducing the unofficial economy. Furthermore, in the year after the introduction of the fiscal reform, NSI reports a decrease in the unemployment rate falls from 6.9 % to 5.6%, and an increase employment rate from 61.7% to 64%. Unfortunately, the financial crisis that unravelled afterwards affects the behavior of the labor market.
In addition, given that labor and capital are assumed to be complements in the Cobb-Douglas production function for registered output, capital stock increases in the new steady state. In turn, output, consumption and investment are also higher under the new tax regime with proportional taxation. Lastly, given the relative abundance of physical capital under the new regime, the after-tax return to capital is lower after the adoption of proportional taxation.
Next, as in Lucas (1990) , total discounted welfare was computed under both the progressive and proportional income taxation regimes. Parameter λ will be used to denote the "compensatory variation,", i.e., the additional consumption (18%) gained in the steady-state, measured in percentage points, from the switching to the steady-state under the propor- Next, series of robustness checks are performed to demonstrate that the model predictions do not change qualitatively when we vary some of parameter values. Table 8 below summarizes the compensatory variation figures when the tax progressivity parameter φ from the two higher income brackets was used. As expected, higher tax progressivity generates a larger welfare gain when proportional taxation is adopted, ranging between 18 − 19.5 percentage points of additional consumption gained depending on the level of progressivity. The final robustness check performed in the model framework was as in Vasilev (2015) to take the top marginal tax rate (22%) under the progressive regime as a better determinant for investment decisions, and use it instead of the progressive tax schedule when computing the compensatory variation relative to the case with the flat tax. Results are reported in Table 9 below: As expected, the gain is significantly larger in this case; it is almost double relatively to the benchmark computational experiment. This is because the top marginal tax rate used in this exercise creates a much larger distortion in the Euler equations for physical capital stock.
This results in a lower after-tax return to both factors of production (since capital and labor are complements in the Cobb-Douglas production function) and decreases their respective steady-state values. In addition, the proportion of workers employed in the official economy decreases, as they move in the unofficial sector, which increases the size of the grey economy relative to measured GDP. Thus, in the absence of the 2008 income tax reforms and under the extreme assumption that the top marginal tax rate is the most important driving force for investment decisions, welfare is substantially decreased.
Conclusions
This paper provided a quantitative evaluation of the welfare effect of the introduction of proportional taxation in Bulgaria in 2008, an effect that operates through the grey economy channel. Using a micro-founded general-equilibrium model, augmented with informal sector, a computational experiment was performed to evaluate the welfare gain from abolishing the progressive taxation regime and switching to a single (flat) tax rate. The lower effective tax burden in the new tax regime led to the relocation of people into the official sector, stimulated investment in physical capital, and increased output and consumption. Finally, under proportional taxation, the size of the informal sector was three times smaller, and quantitatively consistent with estimates obtained in other studies, e.g. OECD (2009), European
Commission (2012) figures. Robustness checks were also performed to demonstrate that the results obtained in this study are not sensitive to the choice of model parameters.
The limitations of the study should also be properly acknowledged. Given that the flat tax in Bulgaria was introduced in the same year the financial crisis unravelled, presenting sufficient evidence clearly linking the effect of the tax reforms to macroeconomic outcomes remains a challenge. A possible venue for further research on the Bulgarian case could be the micro-simulations, as in Paulus and Peichl (2009) , who use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to study the potential distributional effects of certain flat tax reforms in Western Europe.
